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Media is a double edged sword. To an extent, it can make or mar relationships
between two countries, particularly if the two share the shibboleth of historical animus
and have exhibited a definitive trust deficit in the past. It would be naïve to expect a
news report, an editorial piece or an op-ed article to read like a press hand out or a
banquet speech interspersed with bonhomie and pious platitude, but an adverse or a
critical report or a comment in the media on the sensitive and complex Indo-China
relations has all the potential to harden people’s perception, which in turn can tell up
further on the relationship between the two countries. Media can also dispel many a
common myths and negative perceptions and be the ultimate catalyst to promote better
understanding and cooperation.
It, therefore, requires a degree of circumspection. How effective is the media,
particularly the electronic one, can be gauged from the assertion of Marshall McLuhan
who coined the aphorism ‘medium is the message’.2 Media has the potential to be the
spoil sport, particularly in the context of the two countries in question, inheriting the
baggage of a troubled past with the unsettled border dispute and nationalism being an
emotive issue in both the countries. China has long accused the Indian media of playing
a negative role when it comes to bilateral relations. The common complaint has been
against the “hawkish” nature of the Indian media. In this context one of the Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) discussed during the bilateral talks was to involve the
national media from both the sides in the border meetings that are held on the national
days of the two countries. The aim is to portray the bonhomie between the two sides.
The proposal has now been accepted.
This paper aims primarily at making an analysis of both the news captions and its
contents of news magazines and news papers in India and China so as to determine its
impact on people’s perceptions. For this purpose, it attempts to analyse the contents of
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news reports, editorials and opinion pieces, primarily in English newspapers published
both in India and China, with more focus on China. As far as India is concerned, it may
be mentioned that as of now India has four correspondents in Beijing. The newspaper
and news agencies that are represented in China are The Hindu, The Hindustan Times,
The Times of India and the Press Trust of India. As far as China is concerned, the study
focuses on China’s leading English newspaper China Daily, Global Times, People’s
Daily and Xinhua, and the official briefing by the spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of China, etc. Research journals published in both India and China are also to
be studied to discern respective perceptions of the Indian and Chinese scholars. As far
as electronic media is concerned, their contents will be difficult to collate and so are
not taken into consideration.
Chinese Perception of India
The Chinese perception include both the popular perception in the Chinese social
media like the micro blogs and also the state controlled print media like the China
Daily, the Global Times, and the Shanghai Daily, etc.
Social Media – Microblogs
 So far as microblogs are concerned, Simon Shen’s article “Exploring the Neglected
Constraints of Chindia: Analysing the Online Chinese Perception of India and its
Interaction with China’s Indian Policy”3 is one such article in English. The study
identified eight discussion forums to analyse “any discrepancies between the on line
perception and the official Indian policy as the sample groups from which to gather
primary sources.” The eight discussions forums were as under:
1. Strong Nation Forum (SNF) (Qiangguo luntan), set up in 1999 in response to
Belgrade embassy bombing. It “is arguably the earliest and most famous
meeting point of on line Chinese nationalists. It is run by the state owned
People’s Daily (Renmin ribao).
2. Community of Iron and Blood is a forum run by amateurish military fans
which focuses on military affairs. It is also famous for nationalist expressions.
3. Peace Forum is run by the official China Internet Information Center.
4. Resusciation Forum is run by the China Central Television.
5. Tianya Community is privately run from Hainan Island.
6. Phoenix Net Forum is run by the privately owned Satellite Television
Company Limited.
7. FOB Business Forum is a popular platform for Chinese businessmen doing
business overseas, including those who have to interact with Indians.
8. Back China Network is a forum run by overseas Chinese living in the US.
Despite its host’s geographical position, most of its users and readers are from
mainland China rather than Hong Kong.
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The research questions that the study sought to answer are broadly two. The first
question is: What general opinions do internet users voice about India, the Indians and
Beijing’s Indian policy? Secondly, how can the apparent gap between these perceptions
and the official rhetoric of Beijing be explained? And how might such perceptions
influence Sino-Indian relations?
Then the study proposed six propositions to determine the research questions as
under:
(a) Indians are seen as racially inferior to the Chinese.
(b) India is seen as economically backward to China.
(c) India is seen as militarily inferior to China.
(d) India is seen as a western ally helping encircle China.
(e) India is seen subverting Chinese sovereignty.
(f) Sino-Indian strategic partnership receives half-hearted support.
Prof. Simon Shen in his study took one year in time frame (01 November 2008 to
31 October 2009). While concluding the finding of the research, the author wrote that
“although the ratio does not represent a holistic view of these forums, it can still be
used to study their comparative rational levels. Most surprisingly, it is generally found
that the forums normally visited by liberals, despite their relative rationality, do not
show a great deviation of stance towards India from the radical nationalists, making
the online Chinese perception of India more monolithic than that of the US or Japan.
Using a rough calculation, messages expressing a positive feeling towards India
accounted for at most one-tenth.”
Decoding the Chinese Media
Life of Pi
With regards to the perception of India in the Chinese media, it is worth a while to
find out how Ang Lee’s Hollywood blockbuster movie: “Life of Pi” has been perceived
by the Chinese media, including in the social media. This, not only because the film
has an Indian story line, but also because it has an Indian actor -– Suraj Sharma –
playing the main protagonist. Writing about the impact of the movie in China, the
Beijing based correspondent of The Hindu, Ananth Krishnan wrote, “Ang Lee has
appeared to have succeeded in doing what the Indian government has failed to achieve
in over more than a decade of tourism campaigns and promotion drives in China:
rekindling Chinese interest in travelling to India and in Indian culture.” He wrote further,
“Beyond the box office too, the film has sparked a wide debate – and thousands of
comments in the vibrant on line community, with several Chinese writers and micro
bloggers seeing the film as a long-overdue introduction to Indian culture for the Chinese
public often ignorant about India.”4
Surfing the Chinese blogs, he mentions a few very positive comments. One blogger
wrote, “A beautiful film; India is now the most beautiful travel destination in my heart”.
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Yet one more blogger Au Xin, a DJ at Radio Guangdong, said in a message to his
45,000 followers on Sina Weibo that what he liked about the film was director “Ang
Lee’s respect of and belief in Indian culture.” Ms. Ruby, a Beijing-based microblogger,
wrote that the film which also dwells on India’s religious and cultural traditions, would
“correct the prejudice and ignorance about Indian culture (in China)”. Xu Xiaohuang,
an executive at an insurance company in Zhejiang, said the film was “meaningful and
beautiful, and makes me wants to travel to India”. Another micro blogger, whom
Krishnan mentions, said in a post on Weibo that he had taken his daughter to see the
film. He wrote, “India’s Minister of Travel should award Lee with a medal. He presents
the beauty of India to the world”.
In complete contrast to the selection of posts in the Chinese social media by Ananth
Krishnan, the biases and prejudice of a selection of posts by the state controlled print
media is also quite discernable. According to a review of the film in China Daily, “Ang
Lee’s reputation is perhaps the foremost reason for the film’s popularity in China.”5 It
is difficult to accept that the success of the film in China is only because of Ang Lee. It
seems from the comments culled out from social media by Ananth Krishnan that the
Indian story line and the cast also have much to do with the success of the film in China
and this has not been acknowledged in the review of the film in China’s state controlled
media suggesting that the state controlled Chinese media is seldom favourably inclined
towards India’s rich culture and only limits it to the linkage with Buddhism. The review
of the film carried a photograph of Suraj Sharma with Ang Lee. According to the
review, the film received 4 billion posts in Weibo, China’s fastest and most accessible
platforms. It also mentions that “the film deals with many serious issues, such as faith
and morality.” Nowhere in the review was there any mention of India. In one place, it
was only mentioned, “Netizens also interpreted the carnivorous island. Some contend
it represents the Hindu God Vishnu. Others argue it symbolises Pi’s mother. And many
say it was just a fantastical landscape.” The film was also reviewed in Global Times,
which carried the picture of Suraj Sharma squatting on the raft floating in the sea.
Regarding the film the review mentions that Ang Lee “introduces the tender suspense
between characters – boy and beast – as they struggle for placid coexistence”.6
It is evident from this comparative analysis that even though the social media in
China is regulated, the state-controlled media does suffer from inherent prejudices and
has reservations about putting India in any kind of a positive light.
The Delhi Gang Rape
The infamous Delhi gang rape of November 2012 that occupied considerable media
space the world over also found its echo in the Chinese media, including the social
media. Hu Xijin, the editor of the nationalistic party-run Global Times argued in a
widely criticised message to his three million followers on Weibo that the case had
shown the limitations of the rule of law in a democracy. “For a backward society, no
law can help,” he said. “India calls itself the world’s biggest democratic state, but it is
also one of the most disorderly. In the 1960s, China and India had the same level
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of development, but now China’s GDP is three times India’s”.7 Another similar
commentary message printed in the same news paper also reflected the same cynicism,
describing India as “an inefficient and unequal democracy”. “The Indian democratic
system seemingly can’t solve these problems but provides legitimacy for (rulers). India’s
democracy is now manipulated by a small number of elite and interest groups…. Efficient
democracy means more than electoral politics”. The Government-run Beijing Youth
Daily in a Weibo message said, “The current problems in India are fundamentally the
problems of Indian democracy, which is reflected by the weak regime and the invalid
social management”.
But, in the Chinese social media, the news also raised the issue of the vibrancy of
freedom of the press in India. For example one internet user of north eastern Jiliin
responded that “at least India allows protest. If such a thing were to happen in China,
would we have had a large scale protest?” Ananth Krishnan cites yet another comment
in the Chinese social media wherein a blogger Feng Zetangin from Guangzhou referred
to the rape of school students by local officials, but the government failed to do anything.
Bruce Wang, another microblogger, wrote that “China Central Television intensively
reported the rape case in India. But please don’t turn a blind eye to our own country’s
sexual harassment of children.” He further wrote that Kai-Fu Lee, former founding
president of Google China, who has 24 million followers on Weibo and maintains a
hugely popular blog wrote that “the system (in India) allows the people to take to the
street and to expose the scar, so that the government has to face it squarely”. If the scar
is hid firmly”, he added, cryptically, “it will instead fester and become inflamed, and
by the time it is exposed, it would be too late to face it”.
Border Incursion
The incidence of Chinese incursion into the Indian part of Line of Actual Control
(LAC) on 15 April 2013 also found its resonance in Chinese social media. According
to a report in the Times of India8 by its Beijing correspondent Saibal Dasgupta, although
tightly controlled, the Chinese internet space was filling up with hundreds of accusations
that India was playing foul, by raking up a non-issue over an alleged fake infiltration
by the country’s army. He further wrote that many users of Weibo are demanding that
their government “teach India a lesson”. He quotes one Weibo user asking, “Indians
fishing in troubled water working hand-in-glove with Japan.” The report further said
that there were signs of tacit official encouragement of such internet postings, which
have been allowed by censors that usually block any campaign against what they regard
as “friendly countries”.
Chinese Perception of India in their Print-media
How do the Chinese media, particularly print media look at India and Indians in
general? It is true that it may be misleading or erroneous to draw any conclusion from
any single article or even a bunch of articles, but several articles of the Chinese print
media are certainly suggestive of the prejudice of the writers. Even more worrisome is
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the impact it may have on the readers, either Indian or Chinese. Take for example the
article written by Chen Chenchen, the opinion editor of Global Times9, who visited
India few years ago. Let us read the first paragraph of the article, which is as under:
We were heading towards the home of a middle class family living in East End
Apartments, Delhi. The taxi navigated through the night, and the surroundings
appeared increasingly run–down. Looking out of the window, there were few cars
and more rickshaws on the road.
Certainly, the number of cars in China is any time more than they are in India. But
does the observation reflect a typical scene while approaching a Delhi colony? It reflects
a prejudice rather than a discerning observation. In yet another place in the article the
editor wrote:
The Indian family we were visiting included journalists, artists, engineers and
architects. They all warmly invited their neighbours to meet and talk with us. It
was a community of intellectuals, and the women all had decent jobs. Until the
moment we stood up to say good-bye, we still couldn’t believe that the material
standards of these Indian middle class families fell so far below our expectations.
These kind of observations only corroborates the propositions and the findings of
Simon Shen. He further writes, “Certainly, Indians are not necessarily satisfied with
their life, but they do have a more peaceful and satisfied state of mind, which is in
sharp contrast with the anxious, testy Chinese.”
In yet another place in the same article, he writes: “Before going to India, I heard
a story from a friend, saying that he had dinner at the house of a rich Indian businessman,
whose servants kneeled besides the table reverently throughout the meal. The friend
talked to a servant, asking his plan for the future, only to learn his appreciation of his
employer and the gods.” The story was probably exaggerated, but such attitudes do
exist. “Compared with their Chinese counterparts, Indians better understand being
content with their lot, and tend to have less appeals about their interests and rights. It is
hard to tell whether the pros outweigh the cons in this regard. On the one hand this
mentality helps placate the public and facilitate social stability.” This excerpt certainly
contains streaks of the author’s disdain for Indian democracy.
The tendency of Chinese media to put down India in their newspapers and blogsis
also evident in yet another rather disparaging remark. Commenting on Delhi’s transport,
he writes, “Take traffic as a simple example. In the streets of Delhi, vehicles of all sizes
and shapes crowd together. People are everywhere, waiting for a bus ride or ride by
motor cycle. They file into buses whose doors are never close, or sit on overloaded
motorcycles. Cars are lined up in traffic jams, but endless drones from the horn are
rarely heard.” The inherent cynicism of the author is also revealed in yet another place,
“But on the other hand, the Indian sense of reconciliation and relaxation may clash
with or even impede development. Unlike the Chinese, surrounded by a sense of urgency
or ambition, Indians seem less motivated to seize the moment, or catch up with more
49
successful examples, despite wide cleavages, crying out for equality and fairness, and
fighting for a better tomorrow.”
China’s Threat Perception of India
India does not figure high on China’s radar as far as China’s threat perception is
concerned. This is evident from China’s Defence White Paper published from time to
time. But India’s democratic edifice and proximity to the West, particularly the US and
other democratic powers such as Japan, South Korea, and even to some extent Australia,
and now recently, countries of the South East Asia such as Vietnam, Thailand and
Indonesia as well have been of some concern to China. When India revised its defence
doctrine in 2009 to meet the twin challenges of China and Pakistan, there were some
comments in China. Hao Ding, a researcher of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences
wrote an article ‘Great Changes in India’s Defence Strategy – War objective shifts to
giving China importance, while treating Pakistan as lightweight’ in the Party affiliated
Chinese language organ China Youth Daily on 27 November 2009. In the article the
author identified five discernible shifts in India’s defence doctrine.10
In the first place, ‘in terms of goals, India now aims at becoming a global military
power in contrast to its earlier objective of acquiring a regional military status’. Hao
Ding wrote that prior to the end of the Cold War, India followed an expansionist and
hegemonic policy in South Asia by dismembering Pakistan, annexing Sikkim and
dispatching troops to Sri Lanka and Maldives. The article further goes on to assert that
in the twenty-first century, India’s national interests are seemingly expanding and
accordingly, it is striving to protect its strategic superiority in the South Asian sub-
continent as well as in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, India is actively projecting
its power into the Asia-Pacific regions instead of being only a South Asian power. It is
thus making efforts to emerge as ‘a major and positive geo-strategic player’ in the
Eurasian political chessboard.
Secondly, from the point of view of strategic guidelines, as a complete departure
from the usual, India has shifted from the role of ‘passive defence’ to a line of ‘active
and aggressive defence’. Looking at this scenario from the angle of war objectives,
India is now laying emphasis on giving China importance while treating Pakistan as
lightweight, as compared to in the past, where equal emphasis was given to both China
and Pakistan’.
Thirdly, in matters of strategic deployment, India has adopted a strategy of stabilising
its western front and strengthening the northern front, simultaneously giving equal
emphasis to land and sea warfare, in stark contrast to its earlier stress on land warfare’.
To substantiate his point, the Chinese scholar further mentioned how India had already
made plans to dispatch additional two mountain divisions at the Sino-Indian border
and deploy Su-30 fighter aircraft as well as missiles there in order to fight a ‘middle or
small-scale partial border war under high tech conditions’.
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Chinese Reaction to India’s Foray into South China Sea
Perhaps the best illustration of how media affected the relationship between the
two countries can be discerned from how media in both India and China reacted and
responded to India’s foray into the South China Sea. It may be argued that the discord
on the issue was to near hysterical proportion by a large section of media in China.
A new twist was given to India’s ‘Look East Policy’ prior to the visit of India’s
then-External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna to Hanoi in September 2011, to participate
in the 14th India-Vietnam Joint Commission Meeting, when it was declared that the
two countries were to sign an agreement to explore oil in the South China Sea. The
media in the two countries went over board to react and comment. New Delhi and
Beijing, however, at the governmental level handled the issue deftly. On 15th September,
alluding to the media report, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said
that China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea, and that China’s
stand was based on historical facts and international law. It was further stated that
China was opposed to any project in the South China Sea, without directly referring to
India.11
The same day while answering a question raised by a correspondent as to the
Chinese objection to the ONGC Videsh venture, the spokesperson of the Ministry of
External Affairs of Government of India said in New Delhi that ONGC Videsh had
been present in Vietnam for quite some time, including in a major oil venture for off-
shore oil and natural gas exploration, and that they were in the process of further
expanding their cooperation and operation in Vietnam.12
The issue was, however, played out in the media both in China and India. The ultra
nationalist Global Times observed that ‘reasoning may be used first, but if India is
persistent in this, China should try every possible means to stop this cooperation from
happening.’13 An editorial in the same newspaper described the proposal of the ONGC
Videsh as reflecting India’s rising ambition, and a likely Indian move to counter China’s
behaviour in the Indian Ocean. Yet another report entitled, ‘Bundling Strategy over
South China Sea will be disillusioned’ was carried by Xinhua News Agency on 27
September. The report said that India’s oil exploration cooperation with Vietnam in
South China Sea was a blunt trampling up on China’s sovereignty.14 In one more article
titled “Time to teach those around South China Sea a lesson” carried in the Global
Times, it was commented that ‘we (Beijing) shouldn’t waste the opportunity to leave
some tiny scale battles that could deter provocations from going further.’15 The
commentary by the Indian strategic community, though nuanced, was hasty. The
comment by Indian strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan was, however, mature and dignified.
He wrote, “…Vietnam’s new importance to India has been misrepresented by the media
at home and abroad by viewing it through the distorting prism of China.”16
The cooperation between ONGC Videsh and Petro-Vietnam goes back to 1980s,
which led to the signing of the Production Sharing Contract between Hydrocarbon
India Ltd., renamed later as ONGC Videsh, and Petro-Vietnam in Phu Kan basin in
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Vietnam, through the regular bidding process. Later in June 2006, they signed the deal
for the awarding of two exploration blocks 127 and 128. Some of the key areas in
which both the companies are desirous of cooperating are related to a exchange of
information on the petroleum industry, new investments, expansion and operations of
oil and gas exploration and production including refining, transportation and supply in
Vietnam, India and third countries, according to the laws and regulations of their
respective countries.
The signing of the agreement with Hanoi by India further outraged Beijing, which
impelled the official news agency Xinhua to announce that both China and Vietnam
will not allow any third party hostile forces to destroy their relations. Both New Delhi
and Beijing, however, did not allow the relationship between the two countries to drift
further. The then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his meeting with his Chinese
counterpart, Wen Jiabao, on the sidelines of East Asia Summit meeting in Bali reiterated
that the Indian exploration of oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea were purely
commercial and the issue of sovereignty over South China Sea should be resolved
according to the international law and practice. Beijing also reiterated its stated position
that it hoped not to see any outside forces (obviously referring to India) involved in the
South China Sea dispute. The two sides, however in spite of the spat, tried to strike a
friendly note and Beijing even extended a charm offensive saying that “there is no
power in the world that can prevent the development of bilateral relations between the
two countries.” Beijing appeared to suggest that differences with India were driven by
third parties and blamed the United States for sowing seeds of discord between China
and its neighbours and thereby attempting to contain China.
The Chinese position on the issue, however, hardened later. In another article in
April 2016, published immediately after the India-China-Russia trilateral meeting in
Moscow on 18 April 2016, Global Times said, “For years, India had taken a prudent,
yet ambiguous stance over the South China Sea issue. India expressed the same attitude
as China and Russia, indicating a changing state of mind of India. Why is that the
case?” In trying to find a plausible answer, it said, “One possible reason is that India
has been striving for full-fledged membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO). In July 2015, the SCO in Ufa summit launched the process of accession for
India and Pakistan. But India’s inclusion into the SCO has not been completed. India
needs to prove first that its accession can play a constructive role for the unity of the
members of the SCO and the effect of the SCO, internationally. In addition, what rights
India will or will not be entitled to, after it enters the SCO will be determined by the
existing members. Against this backdrop, India taking a consistent stance with China
and Russia in diplomatic matters will facilitate its accession to the SCO and help it
play its role within this regional framework.”17 This clearly suggests that the articles in
the Global Times are commissioned to take a particular stance conveying a clear message
to India and the public at large in both countries as well as to the world. Such articles
are not written by writers to give their own views but are mouthpieces for the ruling
regime in China.
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Chinese Reaction to Growing Indo-US Strategic Proximity
While India’s foray into South China Sea dominated the Chinese media as far as
the Sino-Indian relations are concerned, the related issue of the growing Indo-US
strategic relationship has also attracted the attention of the Chinese media. For example
in March 2012, an article with a disdainful title ‘Nervous India contemplates shelter
under extended wing of eager US’ was carried. 18 The article was written by Liu Zongyi,
a research fellow of the Centre for South Asia Studies at Shanghai Institute for
International Studies. The article also carried an illustration with a large size eagle
(USA) looking at a benign looking, and seemingly attentive small sized elephant (India).
The article said, “With the US return to Asia and the growing economic gap between
China and India, the Sino-Indian relationship is seeing subtle changes these days. Some
Indian scholars trumpet an alliance under the US leadership to counterbalance
China.”
The article further wrote, “There are pessimists (in India), who are supportive of a
China containment policy. According to one estimate by Wu Yongnian of the Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies, 20 to 30 percent of the Indian diplomatic and strategic
circles support Indians confronting China. But since Indian scholars know relatively
little about China and are vulnerable to Western media keen on hyping China’s threat,
the number of those Western and domestic media keen on hyping China’s threat, the
number of those who support confrontation is growing.” Commenting on the role of
media in the US and India exacerbating the relationship between India and China, the
article further said, “… so, at present, we see the ironic sight of articles in both the US
and Indian media trying to provoke the other side into tensions with China. The Indian
media highlights that Uncle Sam is well prepared to battle China, while the US media
points out that India is engaging in military expansion in preparation for possible Sino-
Indian boundary conflicts”.
It is pertinent to mention that although the government controlled media in China
has been critical of the US-India strategic partnership in their commentaries, they know
that India follows a strategic autonomy in its foreign policy pursuits. In an article with
a very carefully worded title ‘Indo-US strategic distrusts stalls LSA signing’ published
in April 2016, the Global Times commented, “…such concerns come from the deficit
of a strategic trust between India and the US. Regardless of the differences in national
policies, Indian strategic elites have always had a constant sense that US is not a
trustworthy partner and this time is no exception.”19 In trying to convey a message to
both India and the US the article further said, “In the first place, the Indians felt offended
by the announcement of an American sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan before Carter’s
visit. There is no sign of bilateral talks on the issue yet but ties with its over arching
rivals are obviously resented by the Indians.” It is an irony that while China has empathy
with India regarding US supplying F-16 fighter to Pakistan, it has no such qualms
about arming Pakistan. In an attempt to create misunderstanding between India and the
US, the article further said, “the Indian media stayed cool about the agreement and
Carter’s visit as well. India’s disappointment comes in particular from the fact that the
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US declined its request on acquiring catapult launch technology, which is critical for
India’s indigenous carrier manufacturing, one of the major backbones of Prime Minister
Modi’s plan on modernising the Indian navy.” The article concluded with a remark to
the proposal regarding joint patrols in the South China Sea. It said, “Evidently enough,
it needs to feel its way forward and try not to agitate China by crossing the bottom line
and consequently it declined to discuss the prospect of joint patrols in the South China
Sea, despite the obvious interest and much enthusiasm from the American counterpart.”
Scoffing at India’s democratic edifice seems to be yet another recurring feature of
China’s party-controlled media. For example, when IMF reported in 2015 that India’s
GDP would surpass that of China in 2016, it invited snide remarks by the Global
Times. Peeved over IMF’s forecast, an editorial in the Global Times in January 2015
made the disparaging remark “having been long overshadowed by China, it is keen to
become the best in some aspects.” It further said, “even if the Indian economy does
outstrip China’s one day, the impact on the Chinese public will be far less than on its
own people, since India has been waiting for this outcome since long. Some Western
media attach much more significance to India’s overtaking China than the Chinese
people themselves do.”20
An article carried in the same newspaper in April the same year was also critical of
the claims of the IMF. The article said that, “while the Chinese economy is slowing
down after entering the new normal, India under Narendra Modi’s government has
witnessed a rapid economic growth in recent years. Speculations that Indian economy
will surpass that of China and India will become a new engine for the world economy
are frequently heard in international public opinions. Some even conjecture that the
Chinese model is inferior to that of India.” The article further remarked, “Hyping the
Indian economy’s superiority, Indian officials and the Western media are instigating
international investors to direct their capital from Beijing to New Delhi, giving impetus
to Indian economic growth. However, such hype has limited effects as profit-oriented
investors try to lower their transaction costs as well. The Indian market, be it in scale,
profit margin or business environment, cannot compete with that of China. Arguing the
differences between Chinese and Indian models, Western scholars are attempting to
take advantage of ideology to deny the efficiency of Chinese political and economic
institutions.”21
The response of the Chinese media towards Prime Minister Modi has been very
measured and structured. As it is finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the positive
achievements of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the article made a studied and guarded
remark that “since he came to office, Modi has boosted the morale of the Indian economy.
However, Modi’s economic reforms have achieved little progress, which is known in
the international community. The falling of oil price will still provide India with years
of opportunities to develop its economy....” Then in a conciliatory tone it said, “If New
Delhi can seize the opportunity to promote major reforms, its long-term economic
development will have a solid foundation.” Yet in another article the Global Times
wrote, “The recent twists and turns in the Sino-Indian relations have presented a
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somewhat puzzling picture to the world. Bilateral relations seem to oscillate back and
forth drastically between outright confrontations and a united front. Clearly, with the
partisan dynamics of domestic agendas as well as the political confidence reaped from
various international scenarios, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government
under Narendra Modi’s leadership has taken new initiatives in India’s relations with
the major powers.”22
India’s infrastructural development along the India-China border and its beefing
up of defence preparedness has also aroused critical comments by the Chinese media.
These responses are again measured and calibrated. An article in Global Times published
in July 2016 carried a loaded title “Deployment of tanks on India-China border hinders
potential for Chinese investment.” “The article begun with an allusion to increasing
Chinese investments in India and then immediately made a critical remark, “it is puzzling
that while deploying tanks near China’s border, India still strives to woo Chinese
investments.” The article further said, “the deploying of tanks near the Indo-China
border may hit a nerve within the Chinese business community, causing investors to
weigh the threat of political instability when they make investment decisions.”23
Indian Perception of Sino-Indian Relations
One of the defining features of the perception of the Indian media, both print and
electronic with regard to China has been both trust deficit and a security dilemma. The
suggestive title of the opinion pieces articles, editorials, news captions and analysis of
their contents attest to this. A major chunk of contents pertains to Sino-Pak nexus,
China’s infrastructural development in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir, border
transgressions, China’s foray into Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, etc. China’s penetration
into India’s telecom sector and its possible security implications has also occupied
some space in the Indian media. Considering the sensitive nature of relationship between
the two countries and the tendency of the media to high light the negativity, in a public
lecture the then National security Adviser of India Mr. Shivshankar Menon exhorted
the media and political commentators to “learn the virtues of moderation”. Menon said
that the Chinese could not believe that Indian media and commentators did not speak
authoritatively for the country, as their controlled media and academia did. “We must
recognise that other countries could have similar imperatives as ours too and their own
reasons for what they do. And why create self-fulfilling prophesies of conflict with
powerful neighbours like China”, Menon said while delivering the 16th Prem Bhatia
Memorial Lecture.24 Earlier at the meeting of the National Security Council Advisory
Board in September 2009, a senior member argued for strong measures to control the
media – especially the 24-hour news channel.25 He was alluding to media reports about
Chinese transgressions along the India-China border.
Conclusion
A scrutiny of the news reports, blog postings, opinion pieces, and editorials in the
Chinese media including the contents of the electronic media clearly suggest the trust
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deficit between the two countries and the tendency to debunk India’s democratic edifice.
Media in China including the social media are intelligently calibrated. There is a lack
of awareness among the Chinese people about India. The understanding is still limited
to Buddhism to a large extent.
As far as India is concerned, besides the trust deficit persistent security dilemma
are the continuing features of the contents of Indian media. The electronic media in
particular hypes the security threat. The Indian correspondence based in Beijing, however
are doing a great service in their objective and at times courageous reporting. They
report on diverse issues and concerns relating to Chinese polity, economy, society,
culture, security and foreign policy. As a result now in India we have a much better
understanding about not only Sino-Indian relations, but also China as a whole.
It would be difficult to expect Beijing to Change its policy beyond rhetoric. The
think-tanks in both the countries should cooperate and collaborate for better
understanding through joint research and publications. There is some goodwill, which
needs to be harnessed. The Indian Embassy and the Ministry of China should be more
proactive. There should be an exchange of Indian movies as well as cultural programmes.
The Indian embassy website for the Chinese people should be more proactive and
thoughtful.
(The author acknowledges the offer of a Cultural Exchange fellowship jointly
sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) and the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, which enabled him to undertake a study-tour to China in
2011.)
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